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I am honored to be part of this conference, which has been bringing 
together scholars and public officials from around the globe for almost 
20 years to discuss religious freedom. It is hard to imagine a more 
worthwhile enterprise. I express my gratitude to the organizers and 
especially to Cole Durham, an indefatigable advocate of religious liberty. 
I am also pleased to join in honoring Dr. Tahir Mahmood, whose 
example of erudition, grace, and kindness is an inspiration to all. 
Religious freedom is a constant source of a dynamic tension in 
pluralistic societies as people of goodwill, and sometimes of not-so-much 
goodwill, struggle to identify the limits of majority rule and individual 
expression. This tension gives us reason to meet frequently and share 
ideas. Because I am a judge on an appeals court of the United States, I 
will speak from an American perspective. That is not to suggest that this 
tension is a uniquely American phenomenon. It is not. But it is an 
important feature of American life, and there is much that can be learned 
from the American experience. 
I begin with a recent story that involves Abraham Lincoln and his 
most famous speech, the Gettysburg Address. Generations of American 
schoolchildren have memorized this speech, given at the dedication of a 
cemetery for those who died at a decisive battle of the American Civil 
War. For Americans, Lincoln’s speech stands alongside the Declaration 
of Independence as an expression of universal ideals that should inform 
democratic government. The speech is short; it was delivered in less than 
five minutes. But Lincoln’s words changed the arc of American 
history—a reminder to speechmakers that to say it longer is seldom to 
say it better. Although much could be said about this remarkable address, 
for my purposes, I highlight only its stirring conclusion, in which 
Lincoln referred expressly to God with these words: “[W]e here highly 
resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain—that this nation, 
 
  This speech was given at the 17th Annual International Law and Religion Symposium on 
Oct. 3, 2010 at Brigham Young University. 
  Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 
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under God, shall have a new birth of freedom—and that government of 
the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the 
earth.”1 
As an aside, I note that scholars have long debated Lincoln’s 
religiosity. He was not what some would call a “churchgoer,” but many 
believe that he became a deeply spiritual man over the course of his adult 
life, especially as he confronted the crisis of the Civil War.2 In fact, one 
scholar writes that Lincoln’s move to end slavery was his part of a 
covenant with God.3  
Several months ago, the organizers of a conference that gathered 
together a prominent group of American lawyers, law professors, and 
law students distributed pamphlets to those in attendance that contained 
some of America’s charter documents, including the Gettysburg Address. 
But unlike the version of Lincoln’s speech with which Americans are 
most familiar, the pamphlet left out the words “under God” from the 
passage I just read to you.4 As you might imagine, this omission has 
spurred a lively discussion that raises important questions about the role 
of religion in American public life.5 Questions like:  
 To what extent is it proper for political leaders to publicly 
express their religious beliefs? 
 Should religious convictions influence how citizens and 
politicians vote? 
 Should we leave religious views at home when we go to 
work or school? 
  
 
 1. Abraham Lincoln, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Gettysburg 
(Nov. 19, 1863), in 7 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 17, 23 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) 
(emphasis added). 
 2. See, e.g., MATTHEW S. HOLLAND, BONDS OF AFFECTION: CIVIL CHARITY AND THE 
MAKING OF AMERICA—WINTHROP, JEFFERSON, AND LINCOLN 200–04 (2007). 
 3. See ALLEN C. GUELZO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: REDEEMER PRESIDENT 339–42 (1999) 
(explaining that Lincoln promised to issue the Emancipation Proclamation if God granted the Union 
victory at the Battle of Antietam). 
 4. Robert P. George, God and Gettysburg, FIRST THINGS, Aug./Sept. 2010, at 15. 
 5. See id.; Caroline Fredrickson, Debate or Distraction: Why Some Are Fretting over the 
ACS Pocket Constitution, ACSBLOG (July 20, 2010, 5:50 PM), http://www.acslaw.org/ node/16548. 
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 Should government protect the religious expression of a 
minority that offends the values of the majority? If so, 
should there be limits to that protection? 
 
Americans disagree about the answers to such questions,6 and the 
recent tussle over Lincoln’s words is, in part, a proxy for the disputes 
over these fundamental matters.  
Significantly, President Obama, who has been public about the role 
his Christian faith plays in his personal and public life,7 has sided with 
those who think religion should have an important role in our public 
discourse. He has argued that: 
 
[S]ecularists are wrong when they ask believers to leave their 
religion at the door before entering into the public square. 
Frederick Douglass, Abraham Lincoln, William Jennings Bryant 
[sic], Dorothy Day, Martin Luther King—indeed, the majority of 
great reformers in American history—were not only motivated 
by faith, but repeatedly used religious language to argue for their 
cause. So to say that men and women should not inject their 
‘personal morality’ into public policy debates is a practical 
absurdity. Our law is by definition a codification of morality, 
much of it grounded in the Judeo-Christian tradition.8  
 
President Obama’s words recognize that, as a matter of history, 
American law has not been silent over the proper role of religion in 
public life. This discussion is carried on against the backdrop of the 
Constitution of the United States, which holds religious expression in the 
highest regard and places much of it beyond the reach of government 
influence or interference. In fact, the First Amendment to the 
Constitution—the initial, and some would argue the primary, right 
among the Bill of Rights9—opens with the Religion Clause, which 
 
 6. See Noah Feldman, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, Few Are Chosen: 
Comparative Religion and the Public Sphere, Address Given at BYU Forum (Nov. 17, 2009), 
available at http://speeches.byu.edu (discussing the various approaches politicians have taken to 
these issues throughout American history). 
 7. Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at National Prayer Breakfast (Feb. 3, 2011), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/03/remarks-president-national-
prayer-breakfast. 
 8. Barack Obama, Call to Renewal Keynote Address (June 28, 2006), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/28/us/politics/2006obamaspeech.html. 
 9. See Burt Neuborne, The House was Quiet and the World Was Calm / The Reader Became 
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provides, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”10 Please note that there 
are two sides to this constitutional coin. On the one side, religious 
expression merits protection from government interference that other 
forms of expression may not.11 On the other side, the government itself 
is limited in its expression of religious belief. The Religion Clause 
ensures the robust presence of religious expression in American public 
life by embracing the principle of “free exercise” of religion: people are 
free to worship God as they choose. As expressed in the United States 
Code, a defining feature of the American view of history is the belief that 
“[m]any of our Nation’s founders fled religious persecution abroad, 
cherishing in their hearts and minds the ideal of religious freedom.”12 
John Leland, an eighteenth-century Baptist minister, summed up the 
American view of religious freedom this way: “[W]hen a man is a 
peaceable subject of [the] state, he should be protected in worshipping 
the Deity according to the dictates of his own conscience.”13 The 
Framers of the First Amendment gave religious freedom special status 
because they believed that religious liberty is fundamental to the very 
idea of democracy. Democracy requires free and spirited dialogue. Self-
government is meaningful only to the extent that people are able to 
express their own beliefs and vigorously challenge the beliefs of others. 
As the Framers knew, religious belief often reflects the most important 
and deeply held views of large segments of the population. Richard John 
Neuhaus, the distinguished cleric, public intellectual, and colleague of 
Martin Luther King, Jr., explained, “[B]iblical religion . . . is undeniably 
public in character. It makes public claims and entails moral judgments 
that are pertinent to the ordering of our public life.”14 To “exclude 
religion and religiously based moral judgment” from public debate 
would undermine “the very idea of democratic governance.”15 
 
the Book, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2019, 2022–23 (2004). 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 11. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of the Free 
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1488–1500 (1990); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205, 215–16 (1972) (“A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as 
a barrier to reasonable state regulation . . . if it is based on purely secular considerations; to have the 
protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief.”). 
 12. 22 U.S.C. § 6401(a) (2006). 
 13. John Leland, The Yankee Spy, in THE WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER JOHN LELAND 213, 
228 (L.F. Greene ed., 1845). 
 14. Richard John Neuhaus, Contending for the Future: Overcoming the Pfefferian Inversion, 
8 J.L. & RELIGION 115, 120 (1990). 
 15. Id. 
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But, as I said, there is another side to this coin—the side that forbids 
“establishment of religion” embraces a principle often described as the 
“separation of church and state.” This metaphor comes from a letter 
Thomas Jefferson wrote in 180216 and is somewhat imperfect,17 but it 
captures an important facet of the Religion Clause: government must not 
take sides in arguments about God or become entangled with a particular 
faith. The Framers of the Religion Clause believed that federal 
establishment of an official religion or even a preference for a particular 
sect would, in Neuhaus’s words, “violate the freedom of those who 
dissent from the established belief.”18 Likewise, Harvard law professor 
Noah Feldman, whose observations about the role of religion in 
American public life I commend to you, has argued that the purpose of 
the prohibition on the “establishment of religion” “was to protect the 
liberty of conscience of religious dissenters from the coercive power of 
government.”19 As Thomas Jefferson wrote, “to compel a man to furnish 
contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he 
disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical.”20  
 
 
The Supreme Court has identified another value that informs the 
principle that government must not become entangled with a particular 
faith. In Engel v. Vitale, the case that famously barred the recitation of 
government-composed prayers from public schools, the Supreme Court 
wrote that “a union of government and religion tends to destroy 
government and to degrade religion.”21 In singling out religion as a part 
 
 16. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Danbury Baptist Assoc. (Jan. 1, 1802), reprinted in 
DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH 
AND STATE 148 (2002) (describing the Religion Clause as establishing “a wall of separation between 
church and State”). 
 17. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(describing Jefferson’s metaphor as “misleading” and emphasizing that the letter to the Danbury 
Baptist Association “was a short note of courtesy, written 14 years after the [First Amendment was] 
passed by Congress”); Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The 
Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 
1379, 1381 (1981) (characterizing the metaphor as “not very helpful in deciding real cases” and 
noting that it has led some to take the mistaken view that “churches and religiously motivated 
citizens have no right to engage in political speech”). 
 18. Neuhaus, supra note 14, at 119. 
 19. Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
346, 350 (2002). 
 20. Thomas Jefferson, Bill 82 of the Revision of the Laws of Virginia (1777) (codified at VA. 
CODE ANN. § 57–1 (2010)). 
 21. 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962). 
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of life over which the government may not exercise undue influence, the 
Constitution places severe limitations on government’s rightful sphere of 
activity. Indeed, the foremost American scholar of religious liberty, 
Stanford law professor and former federal circuit judge Michael W. 
McConnell, writes that freedom from state-sponsored religion “is the 
most powerful possible refutation of the notion that the political sphere is 
omnicompetent—that it has rightful authority over all of life.”22  
So what to do when these principles from the sides of this coin come 
into conflict, when their demands clash? Sometimes the notion that 
government should not entangle itself with any particular faith may seem 
to burden the free exercise of religion. An immigration law prevents an 
American congregation from hiring a British citizen as its pastor,23 
compulsory public education threatens to prevent a close-knit religious 
sect from raising its children as it sees fit,24 and an Air Force regulation 
requiring removal of headwear indoors forces a Jewish officer to choose 
between his commission and his yarmulke.25 Accommodating people of 
faith in these cases seems to take sides in religious disputes. Should the 
religious people in these cases be given special favors not available to 
others? 
These are the issues with which American judges struggle as we seek 
to give life and force to the sometimes competing principles of the 
Religion Clause. How have we dealt with the tension inherent in a 
government that is committed to protecting religious freedom but that is 
limited in the ways it can do so? Our struggle was on recent display at 
the Supreme Court in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez.26 In that case, 
a California state university required that campus groups that received its 
funds and were allowed to use its facilities open their membership to all 
university students.27 The Christian Legal Society restricted its 
membership to those students who publicly professed faith in traditional 
Christian beliefs and adhered to traditional Christian standards of 
conduct, including a rejection of homosexual behavior.28 This latter 
condition barred students committed to gay or lesbian relationships from 
 
 22. Michael W. McConnell, Old Liberalism, New Liberalism, and People of Faith, in 
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 5, 10 (Michael W. McConnell, Robert F. Cochran, 
Jr., & Angela C. Carmella eds., 2001). 
 23. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
 24. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 25. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
 26. 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
 27. Id. at 2979. 
 28. Id. at 2980. 
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joining the group. The university’s policy of open membership put the 
Christian student group to a difficult choice. It could submit to the 
university’s policy, compromise its convictions, and run the risk that its 
membership and leadership would come from those who did not embrace 
the faith that was the very reason for the group’s being, or it could leave 
the campus altogether. The group sued, arguing that a public university 
abridges the “free exercise of religion” when it forces a student group to 
make such a choice.29  
The Supreme Court voted five-to-four to uphold the university’s 
policy. Writing for a majority that has been described as an “uneasy five-
member coalition,”30 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concluded that the 
university’s policy was a reasonable attempt to facilitate the worthy goal 
of making available to all students social and leadership opportunities in 
groups allowed on campus.31 The open membership requirement would 
also help the university enforce its policy against discrimination based on 
sexual orientation. Otherwise, the majority worried that the Christian 
Legal Society could use its restrictive membership requirements to evade 
the university’s anti-discrimination policy.32  
In dissent, Justice Samuel Alito, writing for himself and three other 
justices, argued that the university’s policy abridged the group’s religious 
freedom. “There are religious groups that cannot in good conscience . . . 
admit persons who do not share their faith,” Justice Alito argued, “and 
for these groups, the consequence of [the university’s policy] is 
marginalization.”33 In Justice Alito’s view, the heavy burden the 
university’s policy placed on the Christian Legal Society suggested that 
the policy had been adopted for this very  
purpose, a purpose that violates the Religion Clause’s principle of free 
exercise of religion. 
The differing approaches taken by the majority and the dissent in 
Martinez reflect the tension between the two principles of the Religion 
Clause. The majority saw a public university that was faithful to the 
prohibition on excessive governmental entanglement with religion: it 
applied the same policy to the Christian group that it applied to everyone 
else. No special favors were granted to people of faith. In contrast, the 
 
 29. Id. at 2981. 
 30. Richard A. Epstein, Church and State at the Crossroads: Christian Legal Society v. 
Martinez, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2009–2010, at 105, 106 (Ilya Shapiro ed., 2010). 
 31. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2989. 
 32. Id. at 2990. 
 33. Id. at 3019 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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dissent saw in the same policy an impermissible attempt to silence an 
unpopular religious minority.  
The tension between these two principles is as old as the First 
Amendment, but it is worth noting how the growth of the role of 
government in modern American society brings with it the potential that 
these principles will come increasingly into conflict. Government’s role 
in American society greatly expanded with the emergence of public 
education and social welfare programs, and this expansion brought new 
situations in which a government trying to avoid entanglement with 
religion may find itself impeding what many would view as a person’s 
right to worship freely. As government tries to do more and more, it will 
be increasingly difficult to preserve the needed space in which religious 
freedom can thrive. And as the globe grows smaller and flatter such that 
we become increasingly interconnected with people from different 
backgrounds, traditions, and viewpoints, we will have more reasons to 
gather in places like this to learn from each other’s experiences how best 
to secure religious liberty. 
 
